This article was published in The Broken Rifle, December 2013, No. 98
Find it here:http: http: //www.wri-irg.org/node/22730
LESSONS
FROM THE ARAB SPRING by April
Carter
The
popular unarmed uprisings in the Arab World early in 2011 took the
world by surprise, both because most observers did not expect demands
for human rights and democratic choice to become central in Arab
states, and because they did not expect mass protest to be
predominantly unarmed. However, in retrospect there are many
reasons why initially the 'Arab Spring' took the forms it did in
Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Libya and other states. Moreover,
as scholars of nonviolent civil resistance pointed out, in the first
months the most significant movements displayed some of the classic
characteristics of such resistance. In the longer term, however,
many of the movements have failed to fulfil their initial promise,
overtaken by armed civil war (as happened quickly in Libya and more
gradually in Syria), or failing to achieve their initial democratic
promise - most notably in Egypt. The impressive protests at the
'Pearl Roundabout' in Bahrain were quite quickly crushed, and
pre-emptive offers by rulers of Morocco and Jordan to make reforms to
meet public demands have so far only diluted royal power. This
article briefly elaborates on the points made above, and then raises
some questions about the future.
Why
the Arab Awakening Was Likely to Happen
Internal
factors were important in sparking the uprisings, for example the
growing number of well educated young people combined with
restrictive economic conditions, and growing anger at regime
corruption and repression. But global factors are especially
relevant both to demands for greater democracy and the initial choice
of primarily nonviolent methods. Since the 1980s there has been a
dramatic rise in the number of states around the world adopting
forms of electoral democracy, often in response to people power
uprisings, combined with various international pressures. Even
authoritarian regimes increasingly derive legitimacy from supposedly
free elections, and many examples of people power since 2000 (for
example in Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet states) have
challenged rigged elections. The idea and strategy of nonviolent
resistance have also been promoted widely by some individuals and
activist groups. Some activists in Egypt, for example, learned from
the tent city resisting the rigged elections in the Ukraine in
December 2004, and had read Gene Sharp's writings. Arab activists
may also have been attuned to the significant (if partial) role of
unarmed resistance in the Palestinian struggle, and to the Green
Movement in Iran 2009-10. The role of the internet in spreading
news, and enabling rapid organisation of protests, has clearly been
significant, and well documented, especially in the case of Egypt.
How
Far Did the Initial Uprisings Conform with Nonviolent Strategy?
The
Arab uprisings, which began in Tunisia and then Egypt, were never
strictly nonviolent, but the methods used of strikes, civil
disobedience and in particular occupation of key symbolic spaces and
mass demonstrations were typical of nonviolent resistance, and many
of the demonstrations did reflect an ethos of self-discipline, mutual
friendliness and cooperation between many different sectors of urban
society. Women were quite prominent, students and intellectuals
mixed with workers and artisans, and in Tahrir Square in February
2011 Coptic Christians were welcome alongside Muslims. Even in
Syria, where the regime rested on support from religious minorities -
notably the Alawites, but also the Druze and the Christians - the
nonviolent protesters tried in their slogans and symbolism to create
links across religious divides (Bartkowski and Kahf, September
2013). The unfolding of the uprisings also initially achieved a key
goal of nonviolent resistance strategy: refusal by the security
services to implement a crackdown (Tunisia and Egypt) and defections
by members of the armed forces (Nepstad, 2011).
But
it soon became clear that religious and political divides would
undermine prospects for a smooth transition to more democratic
regime. Even in Tunisia, the first and most successful movement for
regime change, tensions between the more secular liberal groups and
Islamists seeking a more Islamic state, have created problems for the
new 'democracy'. In Egypt the lack of agreement among the secular
opposition groups and their deep division with the Muslim Brotherhood
(together with the unconstitutional actions by the elected President
Morsi) have proved disastrous, opening the way in 2013 to a
reassertion of de facto military rule. The refusal of the Egyptian
military to crush the 2011 uprising and save Mubarak, ambiguous at
the time, now suggests a long term commitment to maintain underlying
military control of the regime through tactical adjustments.
Defections
by sections of the armed forces before the uprising had developed
sufficient societal unity and leverage for nonviolent change led to
civil war in Libya and western military intervention. In Syria
soldiers did begin to flee Syria, and to cross over to the rebels -
at risk of execution, but Nepstad, writing in 2011, argued that
because only a very small proportion of the military had defected,
Assad was able to block the uprising. Some officers and soldiers who
changed sides formed the Free Syrian Army, which
over
time has turned the conflict into an armed struggle, and given the
intransigence of the Assad regime and their recruitment of Hizbollah
fighters from Lebanon, created conditions for external forces to turn
the conflict into a destructive war between ruthless extremists. By
now most observers have forgotten the months of brave unarmed
protest in 2011 and are unaware of continuing protests by the
nonviolent resisters, and the fate of Syria seems to depend on
external powers (Iran and Russia backing Assad, and the West
supporting the moderate opposition.)
Future
Prospects
Ironically,
those movements that suffered initial defeat or failed to gain
momentum may now have better prospects than some that overthrew their
dictators. Although the Bahrain government, backed by the
reactionary Saudi Arabian government, quickly crushed the uprising,
protests there continue, including celebrations of the anniversary of
the uprising in both 2012 and 2013, and there have been some signs of
possible regime concessions. Not only regional but international
power relations have been unhelpful to the Bahrainis, as the USA has
a large naval base there and gives more weight to its strategic
interests than to its professed ideal of democracy in this context.
Nevertheless, the factors that encouraged the 2011 uprisings still
create a context for further popular pressure, not only in Bahrain
but in Jordan and Morocco, where protests on both political and
socio-economic issues continue.
Unfortunately,
however, the fallout from Libya which remains politically very
unstable and is now exporting Islamic extremism to Tunisia, and the
even more worrying prospects of Syrian disintegration, do not bode
well for prospects of peaceful democracies in the region. When 2011
started, the mass unarmed displays of people power and calls for
greater political freedom, democratic choice and governmental
accountability took the initiative away from violent jihadists
committed to an authoritarian Islamic future. The fighting in Syria
has brought Al Qaeda and similar groups back into the political
frame. As a result the need for creative nonviolent solutions, most
notably in Egypt, has become more acute.
Bibliography
Maciej
Bartkowski and Mohja Kahf, 'The Syrian Resistance: a Tale of two
Struggles', openDemocracy, 23 and 24 September 2013
Sharon
Erickson Nepstad, 'Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The
Critical Role of Military-Opposition Alliances', Swiss Political
Science Review, 2011, 17(4): 485-91.
1210
words
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